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NOTES
PROCEDURE
With the advent of the "just cause" provision in labor-man-
agement contracts certain procedural machinery has been estab-
lished, either by contract or custom, which operates to assure a
"due process" disposition of a discharge or discipline case. The
purposes of this article are to discuss these procedural requisites
and to consider awards wherein an employer discharged or dis-
ciplined an employee without following the prescribed proce-
dural requirements.
Since most labor agreements provide adequate means, through
a grievance procedure and arbitration, to have an unjust penalty
set aside, arbitrators are reluctant to imply conditions which
restrict management's right to discharge or discipline.' How-
ever, in one award where a truck driver had been summarily
discharged, but later reinstated when he was acquitted in a
criminal suit, the arbitrator based his decision to set aside the
discharge, partially upon the fact that the employer, even though
he was not required to do so by contract, had failed to provide
a hearing before discharge.2 Though no general statement may
be made, it seems that arbitrators will apply the doctrine of
"casus omissus" when necessary - Mr. Gollub3 suggests that
arbitrators have done this in several New York awards.
1. In re Third Avenue Transit Corporation, Surface Transportation
Corporation of New York, the Yonkers Railroad Company, Westchester
Street Transportation Company, Inc., and The Westchester Electric Rail-
road Company and Transport Workers Union of America (CIO), 1 LA
321 (1946)-the arbitrator refused the union's request to imply a provi-
sion for a hearing in discipline cases because a hearing would present
unnecessary difficulty of administration-any wrong could be remedied
readily by use of the grievance procedure; In re Sivyer Steel Casting
Company and United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, Local 800 (CIO), 1 LA 485 (1945), where the griev-
ance procedure after discharge was a sufficient protection for employees
and thus the arbitrator refused to imply a provision for a hearing in
discipline or discharge cases.
2. In re Boston and Maine Transportation Company and Amalgamated
Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees, Local
1038 (AFL), 5 LA 3 (1946); In re Cumberland Undergarment Company,
Inc. and International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, Local 434 (AFL),
5 LA 766 (1946), where the company summarily discharged employees who
were suspected of leading an unauthorized strike and although the con-
tract did not require a hearing before discharge, the arbitrator held that
the company should have consulted with the international before discharg-
ing the men.
3. Myron Gollub, Discharge for Cauoe (N. Y. Dept. of Labor 1948) 30,
31.
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The major problem arises when an employer discharges or
disciplines an employee without following the procedure pro-
vided in the labor agreement. Some contracts provide extensive
pre-arbitration procedure, including notice, hearing and appeal
within the managerial hierarchy; others merely provide for
notice or an informal consultation between the company and the
union. Although the awards seldom turn upon the amount of
pre-arbitration procedure required, an arbitrator is apt to apply
a strict interpretation and, therefore, set aside a discharge if the
employer breached the terms of a contract which provided for
detailed procedure. 4 The apparent reason for this is that the
parties clearly manifested an intention to impose conditions
precedent upon management's prerogative to discharge or dis-
cipline.
Since the general purpose of these requirements is to protect
an employee, an arbitrator will set aside a discharge if there
is any suggestion that an employer's breach denied the employee
"due process." 5 However, if the merits of the case are properly
4. In re Die Tool & Engineering Company and United Automobile, Air-
craft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 155 (CIO),
3 LA 156 (1946), where the company gave notice and reason of discharge
to the union rather than to the employee as required by contract. The
arbitrator set aside the discharge because the employee was deprived of
an opportunity to present his defense; In re Four Wheel Drive Auto
Company and Associated Unions of America, Office and Professional Work-
ers Local 15, 4 LA 170 (1946)-here notice was not given to the union
and the lack of notice deprived the union of an opportunity to institute
the grievance procedure.
5. In re International Shoe Company, Bluff City Reconstruction Prepara-
tory Plant and United Shoe Workers of America, Local 100-A (CIO), 3
LA 500 (1946); In re International Minerals and Chemical Corporation
and International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 415
(CIO), 4 LA 127 (1946), where it was held that the company, before
exercising its right to discharge, must observe provisions of the contract
and ascertain the real guilt of suspected violators; In re Ford Instru-
ment Company and United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of Amer-
ica, Local 425 (CIO), 4 LA 403 (1946), where the discharge was set aside
where the company mistakenly assumed that certain men could be dis-
charged without first consulting the union as provided by the contract-
In re Quaker Oats Company and Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied
Workers Union of America, Local 125 (CIO), 5 LA 250 (1946), where
since the union was prevented from instituting the grievance procedure
when the company failed to give the union steward notice as required by
contract, the arbitrator held that the merits of the discharge must be
tried by the grievance committee; In re Ranney Refrigerator Company
and United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, Local 308 (CIO), 5 LA 621 (1946); In re Coca-Cola Bottling
Company of New York and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Soft Drink Workers Union,
Local 812 (AFL), 9 LA 197 (1947), where the company failed to give
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before the arbitrator,", and if he finds that notwithstanding the
employer's breach the employee's conduct warranted discharge,
the discharge will be sustained, but the employee will be awarded
back pay for the time between the discharge and award7 A
limitation is imposed upon this latter rule when, by contract
or custom, the employer is under a duty to warn the union and
the employee that the latter's conduct is sub-standard and a
basis for discharge, but the employer discharges without prior
warning. Although the arbitrator may permit some disciplinary
action, he will set aside a discharge if the union or the employee,
or both, were not warned., A somewhat analogous problem
the discharged employee the notice and hearing required by ten year
custom. The charge was theft and only circumstantial evidence had been
considered by the company. The arbitrator set aside the discharge on the
ground that the employee had been denied an opportunity to defend him-
self.
6. In some cases the question of the arbitrator's jurisdiction is raised
by the company, for some contracts provide that a discharge becomes final
if either the union or the employee does not file a grievance within a
stated period; In re Four Wheel Drive Auto Company and Associated
Unions of America, Office and Professional Workers, Local 15, 4 LA 170
(1946); In re Quaker Oats Company and Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and
Allied Workers Union of America, Local 125 (CIO), 5 LA 250 (1946).
If the employer breached the contract and the breach prevented the filing
of the grievance, the arbitrator may take jurisdiction (4 LA 170, upra)
or he may not (5 LA 250, supra). In any event, if the employer breached
the contract, the merits will be heard either by the grievance committee
or the arbitrator (4 LA 170, supra; 5 LA 250, supra). See also In re
Michigan Steel Casting Company and United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 155 (CIO), 6 LA
678 (1947).
7. In re Schreiber Trucking Company and Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 118 (AFL), 5 LA 430
(1946); In re Columbian Rope Company and United Farm Equipment and
Metal Workers, Local 184 (CIO), 7 LA 450 (1947); In re Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Company and Federation of Glass, Ceramic and Silica Sand
Workers of America (CIO), 8 LA 317 (1947); In re New York Tribune,
Inc. and American Newspaper Guild, Newspaper Guild of New York,
Local 3 (CIO), 8 LA 410 (1947); In re Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. and
Distillery, Rectifying and Wine Workers' International Union of America,
Distillery Workers Union, Local 55 (AFL), 10 LA 675 (1948); In re
Hudson County Bus Owners Association and Amalgamated Association of
Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees, Division 1276 (AFL),
3 LA 786 (1946); In re The Mosaic Tile Company and Federation of
Glass, Ceramic and Silica Sand Workers of America, Local 79 (CIO), 9
LA 625 (1948); cf. In re Ford Motor Company and United Automobile,
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers (CIO), 6 LA 799 (1947).
8. In re The Federal Machine and Welder Company and United Elec-
trical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 730 (CIO), 5 LA 60
(1946), where the contract did not require notice or warning slip before
discharge. However, existing plant rules provided for the routing of such
a slip to the union. Where this had not been done the arbitrator set aside
the discharge. In re Pyrene Manufacturing Company and United Elec-
trical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 444 (CIO), 9 LA
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arises when the employer attempts to invoke "hip pocket" legis-
lation, for example, discharges for conduct which was previously
condoned without prior notice to the union or employee. These
cases generally arise under contracts which do not state specific
grounds for discharge, but merely provide that the employer
may discharge for "just cause." Under these contracts most
arbitrators require the employer to notify the union and the
employees what conduct will be a basis for discharge, and, absent
such notice, a discharge will be set aside though some discipline
may be authorized. 9
By analogy to the rule that criminal statutes must state a
definite penalty for the offense, arbitrators require discipline for
admitted offenses to be specific and to be imposed for a definite
period.10 . A further requirement is that the discipline must be
787 (1948), where the employer as a matter of policy issued warning slips.
a discharge is invalid when the employer fails to issue such a warning.
However, the employee was denied back pay. See also, In re National
Lead Company, De Lore Division and United Gas Coke and Chemical
Workers of America, Local 229 (CIO), 9 LA 973 (1948).
9. In re Norwich Pharmacal Company and Drug Trade Salesmen's
Union (CIO), 5 LA 536 (1946), holding that the company cannot dis-
charge without giving proper notification of the standards it expects; In
re A. I. Namms and Son and Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Employees, Department Store Employees Union, Local 1250 (CIO), 7 LA
704 (1947), holding that the company should inform the union that prac-
tices previously allowed would no longer be condoned; In re Aluminum
Company of America and International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 808 (CIO), 8 LA
234 (1945), holding that the company cannot depart from past disciplinary
measures and procedures without a prior explanation or warning; In re
Cedartown Textiles, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America, Local
820 (CIO), 8 LA 360 (1947), holding that discharge is too serious a
penalty for profanity in the absence of a specific warning that it will be
considered grounds for discharge. The company was permitted to impose
a monetary penalty.
10. In re Republic Steel Corporation and United Steel Workers of Amer-
ica, Local 2176 (CIO), 6 LA 85 (1947), holding that if the company
suspends an employee for one day only, it cannot later contend that the
employee should have been and was suspended for two days; In re Ford
Motor Company and United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America (CIO), 8 LA 1023 (1947), holding that the
company must observe and inflict appropriate discipline according to the
agreement and must set a pattern which the employee can understand
and rely upon-the company cannot follow an inconsistent disciplinary
procedure; In re Pan American Refining Corporation and Oil Workers
International Union, Local 449 (CIO), 9 LA 47 (1947), holding that a
company may not discipline an employee for an indefinite time, but that
the employee should be informed of what his penalty is, and when it will
cease- of In re Thompson Products, Inc. and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 247 (CI0), 9 LA
119 (1947), holding that indefinite suspensions for refusal to work as
directed are justified until the employees do as they are told, since there
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imposed within a reasonable time after the offense," and unless
the employer expressly states otherwise, it is assumed that such
discipline is entire, rather than partial.12 A final limitation is
that an employer may not consider past offenses, for which he
imposed no penalties, when he is contemplating discharge or
discipline for a present offense.13
ROBERT G. MCCLINTOCK
EVIDENCE, BURDEN AND QUANTUM OF PROOF
I. RuLEs OF EVIDENCE
In the absence of statutes arbitrators are not bound by tech-
nical rules of evidence., Since the arbitrator is selected by the
parties, who impliedly trust his competence and impartiality,
there is not the need for excluding relevant though questionable
evidence which exists in a trial at law. Moreover, if the arbi-
trator excluded evidence on technical grounds, it might appear
to the parties, especially those not represented by attorneys,
that he was not discharging his declared purpose of seeking out
the facts. Accordingly, arbitrators are permitted, and some-
times required under penalty of vacation of the award, to receive
any evidence which appears to be pertinent and material.2 Hear-
say and other legally incompetent evidence are freely received,
the arbitrator retaining the power and the duty to judge their
was no danger involved in carrying out the directions, and since the direc-
tions had been successfully carried out in the past.
11. In re Aluminum Company of America and International Union,
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, Local 808 (CIO), 8 LA 234 (1945), holding that an employee
may expect disciplinary action to come within a reasonable time after
the offense is committed, or not at all.
12. Ibid., holding further that when discipline is imposed, the employee
may expect that it is not partial punishment, the remainder of which is
to follow at some time in the future.
13. In re Western Automatic Screw Company and United Automobile,
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 101(CIO), 9 LA 606 (1948), holding that the company may not bring in past
infractions for which no discipline was invoked, when it is determining
seniority rights for lay-off purposes.
1. Dana v. Dana' (1927) 260 Mass. 460, 157 N. E. 623; Koepke v. E.
Liethen Grain Co. (1931) 205 Wis. 75, 236 N. W. 544.
2. Rexburg Inv. Co. v. Dahle and Eccles Const. Co. (1922) 36 Idaho 552,
211 Pac. 552; Dickens v. Luke (Mo. App. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 161; Gian-
napulos v. Pappas (1932) 80 Utah 442, 15 P. (2d) 353; Dick v. Supreme
Body of International Congress (1904) 138 Mich. 372, 101 N. W. 564.
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